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ARGUMENT
I.
RETURN OF THE EARNEST MONEY IS NOT A CONDITION
PRECEDENT TO FILING SUIT
Defendant now argues that the return the earnest money is a condition precedent to
filing suit and that failure to do so prohibits this claim. Defendant has not raised the
condition precedent argument until nowr. It is being raised for the first time on appeal.
Because the argument was raised for the first time on appeal, it should not be heard by
this court. Franklin Financial v. New Empire Dev. Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah
1983).
Even if this court were to consider the ''condition precedent argument." that
argument is not sound. While it is true that conditions precedent can be created by
agreement between the parties, "conditions are not favored and [] where doubt exists,
they will not be presumed." 1A C.J.S., Actions, §46.
Appellees cite no cases to support their bold proposition that return of the earnest
money is a condition precedent to seeking legal or equitable relief. Instead, appellee
relies entirely upon the contract language. In this case, the agreement between the parties
does not require return of the earnest money prior to filing suit. As explained in the
appellant's brief, the contract simply requires return of the earnest money prior to
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judgment. That is especially true Under our legal system in which inconsistent pleadings
are allowed and conditions precedent are not favored by the courts.
At the trial level, the appelllpes argued that failure to return the earnest money was
an irrevocable election of remedies. They appear to have completely abandoned that
argument and now urge this court to rely upon a new legal theory. As stated in the
appellants' opening brief, the election of remedy analyses relied upon in the earlier
earnest money cases does not warrant dismissal of this case.
Defendants do not argue that! any public policy favors the strict rule they are
pressing this court to adopt, nor do they dispute the public policy arguments raised by the
appellants and which support allowing a seller to return the earnest money after filing
suit.

II.
THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE!TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY WAS
WAIVED
A. THE DEFENSE OF FAILURE TO RETURN THE EARNEST MONEY MAY
BE WAIVED.
The defendants cite no cases or authority for the proposition that the defense of
failure to return the earnest money cannot be waived. Because the defense was created by
agreement between the parties, it only makes sense that the parties can agree to waive it.
As stated previously, this court should) not consider the "condition precedent argument'
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asserted by the defendants. If this court were to consider that argument however, that
would not prevent the defendants from waiving the defense. Conditions precedent may
be waived. 1 A, C J.S., Actions, §46 ("where the conditions are such that they do not
prevent the accrual of the right, but operate merely on the remedy, performance thereof
may be waived by defendant"). In this case, the condition precedent asserted by the
defendants speak solely to the remedy. Failure to return the earnest money does not
impact upon the formation or performance of the essential elements of the real estate
purchase contract. Instead, failure to return the earnest money impacts solely upon the
remedy available. Thus, it can be waived.

B. THE DEFENDANTS WAIVED THE DEFENSE OF THE RETURN OF THE
EARNEST MONEY.
Defendants dispute the factual findings made by the trial court judge. Specifically,
they claim that the trial court judge incorrectly held that they failed to raise the return of
the earnest money in their answer and that they stipulated to waive the defense. An
appellee may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files
a timely cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff. 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this
case, the defendants did not file a timely cross appeal and their cross appeal has been
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it,
this court should reject the argument on several other grounds.
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The defendants claim that jthey raised the defense in their answer. The closest
thing to raising the defense in their answer is the Fourth Defense which reserved the right
to raise additional affirmative defenses they learned of during the discovery process.
Such a statement is insufficient to Iraise an affirmative defense and the trial court properly
found that the defense was not raised in the answer.
The defendants failed to preserve for appeal their argument that they didn't
stipulate to waive the defense. On pages 18 and 19 of their brief, the defendants quote an
exchange before the trial court judge and counsel for the defendants. The exchange can
be found in the Record at R. 516, page 11. In the exchange, the trial court judge asks Mr.
Bradford if he was claiming that the defendants had not stipulated to waive the defense.
The trial court judge indicated that he intended to hold an evidentiary hearing if that was
at issue. Counsel for the defendants stated that he was simply resting his argument on
whether the defense could be waivecjl. Relying upon that, the trial court judge entered his
findings without holding an evidentiary hearing.1

1

THE COURT: If that's true, then, if there's some ambiguity then I would need to have a
hearing. But if you're not resting on some ambiguity, you're basically saying you can't waive it."
MR. BRADFORD: That's right, and that is what I'm saying.
THE COURT: So that's why I'm saying I don't want to mince words. If we're going to
talk about it some other way, I mean, Mil
MR. BRADFORD: Whatever the agreement was, whatever the conversation was - and I
wasn't there - and whatever the letter sa^s, and however Mr. Abbott intended it, my position is it
was not waivable after the fact.
-4-

Further, the defendants are required to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's decision. U.R.A.P. 24(9). The defendants have failed to do so. For that reason,
their argument should not be heard.
Finally, the evidence before the trial court clearly showed that the defendants
stipulated to waive the defense.
III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY RETURNING THE
EARNEST MONEY TO THE PLAINTIFFS
Defendants dispute the return of the earnest money to the plaintiffs. An appellee
may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files a timely
cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff 739 P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this case,
the defendants did not file a timely cross appeal and their cross appeal has been
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it,
this court should reject the argument on several other grounds.
The defendants argue that the court should not have returned the earnest money
because they did not breach the contract. Unfortunately, the defendants made a motion to
dismiss the case at the close of the plaintiffs' case. Thus, the trial court never had an
opportunity to make a decision on the merits. The defendants now complain that the trial
court should have reached a decision on the merits. The defendants created the problem

THE COURT: Okay.
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of which they now complain. Thiy are the ones who requested the trial court judge to
abort the trial and dismiss the case without reaching the merits. They cannot now claim
harm because of the situation theyl created.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR BY REDUCING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES
Defendants dispute the return of the earnest money to the plaintiffs. An appellee
may not seek to modify the decision or judgment below unless the appellee files a timely
cross appeal. Halladav v. Cluff. 73^ P.2d 643, 645 n.4 (Utah App. 1987). In this case,
the defendants did not file a timely iross appeal and their cross appeal has been
accordingly dismissed. If this court were to determine that the issue is properly before it.
this court should reject the argument on several other srounds.
The defendants argue that they deliberately failed to raise the defense of failure to
return the earnest money so that they could obtain a dismissal with prejudice. Only after
the plaintiffs rested and they believeq they could obtain a dismissal with prejudice did
they raise the defense.
The contract states that the prevailing party shall be awarded a reasonable
attorneys fee. The fee sought by defense counsel was not reasonable, because the
litigation strategy pursued by defense counsel was not appropriate. Attorneys have a duty
to expedite litigation. Further, they hajve a duty not to mislead others involved in
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litigation. By holding his defense in his back pocket until after the plaintiffs rested,
defense counsel wasted his time, opposing counsel's time and the court's time. Further
by stipulating to waive the defense while harboring a strategy to raise it at a later date,
defense counsel mislead opposing counsel. The defense strategy was not appropriate or
reasonable and thus no fee should have been awarded for pursuing it.
Finally, defendants do not dispute that the trial court erred by dismissing the case
with prejudice. Because the trial court erred in dismissing the case with prejudice, the
basis behind the defense strategy was erroneous. Thus, no fee should have been awarded
for pursuing that strategy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the appellants (plaintiffs) respectfully request this
Court to overturn the order of the trial court dated November 25, 2000 and to remand this
case to the trial court with instructions that the trial court deny the motion to dismiss and
hear this case on its merits. Further, the appellants request their costs on appeal.
DATED this 11th day of August, 2001.

Nelson Abbott
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I hereby certify that a copy jof the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant was duly
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